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ABSTRACT
Objective: Many existing tests of social cognition are not
appropriate for clinical use, due to their length, complexity or uncer-
tainty in what they are assessing. The Edinburgh Social Cognition
Test (ESCoT) is a new test of social cognition that assesses affective
and cognitive Theory of Mind as well as inter- and intrapersonal
understanding of social norms using animated interactions.
Method: To support the development of the ESCoT as a clinical
tool, we derived cut-off scores from a neurotypical population
(n¼ 236) and sought to validate the ESCoT in a sample of
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; n¼ 19) adults and neurotypical
controls (NC; n¼ 38) matched on age and education. The ESCoT
was administered alongside established tests and questionnaire
measures of ASD, empathy, systemizing traits and intelligence.
Results: Performance on the subtests of the ESCoT and ESCoT
total scores correlated with performance on traditional tests,
demonstrating convergent validity. ASD adults performed poorer
on all measures of social cognition. Unlike the ESCoT, performance
on the established tests was predicted by verbal comprehension
abilities. Using a ROC curve analysis, we showed that the ESCoT
was more effective than existing tests at differentiating ASD adults
from NC. Furthermore, a total of 42.11% of ASD adults were
impaired on the ESCoT compared to 0% of NC adults.
Conclusions: Overall these results demonstrate that the ESCoT is
a useful test for clinical assessment and can aid in the detection
of potential difficulties in ToM and social norm understanding.
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Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) experience difficulties in social
functioning as a core feature of ASD (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013).
The central processes thought to be necessary for effective social functioning are
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referred to as social cognition (Adolphs, 2009; Baez et al., 2016; Baez et al., 2012;
Henry et al., 2015; Van Overwalle, 2009). In everyday social interactions, we use social
cognitive abilities such as theory of mind (ToM; i.e., the ability to recognize other
people’s mental states to understand and predict their behavior) and the understanding
of social norms (Baez et al., 2012, 2013) to interact and respond appropriately to others.
ToM is an important social cognitive ability, and ToM difficulties can cause signifi-
cant social deficits which profoundly limit functional capacity to engage in meaningful
interpersonal relationships and quality of life (Henry et al., 2015). ToM is a multi-
dimensional concept, with processes differing based on cognitive or affective judg-
ments (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). Cognitive ToM is defined as the ability to make
inferences about the intentions and beliefs of another individual. Affective ToM refers
to the ability to make inferences about what another individual is feeling (Kalbe et al.,
2010; Sebastian et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). Considerable research has
shown that ASD adults have difficulties with both aspects of ToM (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001; Mathersul et al., 2013; Murray et al., 2017).
The specific ToM difficulties that ASD adults experience have been studied exten-
sively over the last several decades (Murray et al., 2017). However, the literature con-
sists of many incongruent findings (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Couture et al., 2010;
Roeyers et al., 2001); potentially as a consequence of the tests used to assess ToM.
Early studies examining ToM in adults used false-belief tests designed for children and
found that ASD adults performed as well as neurotypical controls (NC) (Happe, 1994;
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; White et al., 2009) but still show marked problems in
social interactions in everyday life (Dziobek et al., 2006; Palmen et al., 2012). To over-
come this limitation in sensitivity, researchers developed more advanced tests and
demonstrated difficulties in adults with ASD on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
(RME) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001), the Awkward Moments Test
(Heavey et al., 2000), the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC)
(Dziobek et al., 2006), Reading the Mind in Films Test (RMF) (Golan et al., 2006), The
Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT) (Mathersul et al., 2013) and the Strange
Stories Test (Murray et al., 2017).
Yet, these advanced tests are not without their limitations. For instance, ASD
adults can pass forced-choice social cognition tests such as the RME (Baez et al.,
2012; Izuma et al., 2011; Klin, 2000; Schilbach et al., 2012), but have difficulties on
tests which require spontaneous attributions of mental states (Senju et al., 2009).
Moreover, ToM tests using written stories do not capture contextually specific ToM
abilities used in everyday social interactions (Frith, 2004; Klin, 2000; Lugnegård
et al., 2013). Individuals can pass the Strange Stories test but still exhibit difficulties
in real-world social interactions (Scheeren et al., 2013). The abstract nature of tests
which use forced-choice answers and lack context limits their ecological validity
because the relationship to real-world functioning is unclear (Mathersul et al., 2013).
To address this limitation, McDonald et al. (2003) developed the TASIT, which uses
short-clips of social interactions. However, it is a lengthy test with an administration
time of 60–75minutes (Mathersul et al., 2013; McDonald et al., 2003), which limits
the TASIT’s application in time-sensitive clinical environments. The MASC (Dziobek
et al., 2006) is similar to the TASIT; yet, it is a verbal interaction between characters
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that is dubbed into English. As such, important contextual information relating to
the interactions may have been lost in translation, limiting its use in English speak-
ing populations.
Other limitations include current tests of social cognition potentially being related
to intellectual abilities. Verbal comprehension significantly correlates with or predicts
performance on the RME (Baker et al., 2014), Strange Stories test (Kaland et al., 2002),
RMF (Golan et al., 2006) and the TASIT (McDonald et al., 2003). Perceptual reasoning
also significantly correlates with performance on the RME (Baker et al., 2014). Such
findings may limit the interpretation from these tests.
While most existing tests have focused on assessing ToM, social cognition consists
of several different abilities that are simultaneously required during social interactions.
Other social cognitive abilities have received less attention in the literature. An individ-
ual’s interpersonal (how another person should behave) and intrapersonal (how they
themselves should be behave) understanding of the social norms that govern
their behavior are important social cognitive abilities. Violating a social norm can be
detrimental to existing relationships or opportunities to form social relationships.
Inter- and intrapersonal understanding of social norms have been examined separately
in ASD adults, showing mixed findings (Baez et al., 2012; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013;
Lehnhardt et al., 2011; Thiebaut et al., 2016; Zalla et al., 2009). To our knowledge,
there is currently no clinical test of inter- and intrapersonal understanding of
social norms within the same test. Similarly, these abilities have never been examined
alongside ToM abilities within the same test. Researchers typically investigate social
norm understanding and ToM using different tests. For example, Baez et al. (2012)
found that ASD adults were not impaired on affective ToM measured by the RME or
intrapersonal understanding of social norms assessed by the Social Norms
Questionnaire (Rankin, 2008). This makes direct comparisons problematic, since these
different tests may vary in difficulty.
Aims of the current study
The Edinburgh Test of Social Cognition (ESCoT) (Baksh et al., 2018) is a recently devel-
oped test of social cognition which assesses cognitive and affective ToM and inter-
and intrapersonal understanding of social norms within the same test. In NC adults
between the ages of 18–85, it was demonstrated that poorer performance on inter-
and intrapersonal understanding of social norms and ESCoT total scores was predicted
by the presence of more autism-like traits. Increasing age predicted poorer perform-
ance on interpersonal understanding of social norms, cognitive and affective ToM, as
well as ESCoT total scores. In addition, female participants were better at inferring
what another person was feeling. Finally, performance on the ESCoT was not predicted
by verbal comprehension or perceptual reasoning abilities unlike established tests
(Baksh et al., 2018). The aim of the present study was to validate the ESCoT in a sam-
ple of ASD adults. While new tests have been published such as Strange Stories Film
Task (Murray et al., 2017) and Story-based Empathy Task (Dodich et al., 2015), these
tests only assess ToM. Moreover, none of the tests assess within-subjects’ social cogni-
tive abilities in different contexts, as well as assessing four social cognitive abilities
within the same test.
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Aims
1. To examine the convergent validity of the ESCoT against established tests
of social cognition. We predicted that better performance on the ESCoT would
correlate with better performance on the traditional tests of social cognition.
2. To compare ASD adults and NC adults on the ESCoT and established tests of social cog-
nition. Based on previous findings in the literature, we predicted that ASD adults would
be impaired on cognitive ToM; affective ToM and interpersonal understanding of social
norms, but not intrapersonal understanding of social norms compared to NC adults.
3. To evaluate the psychometric properties of the ESCoT and compare these to trad-
itional social cognition tests by examining the influence of intelligence, ASD traits,
empathy and systemizing traits on performance.
Method
Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT)
The ESCoT consists of eleven dynamic, cartoon-style social interactions (each approxi-
mately 30 seconds long): one practice interaction, five interactions involving social
norm violations and five interactions without social norm violations. Participants
watched the animated interaction on a computer screen and a static storyboard
depicting a summarized version of the interaction was presented at the end. The
storyboard remained on the screen during the subsequent questions for each inter-
action. Please see Figure 1 for an example interaction.
Participants were asked five questions after viewing each animation relating to: (1)
general story comprehension; (2) cognitive ToM; (3) affective ToM; (4) interpersonal
Figure 1. An example interaction from the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT).
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understanding of social norms; and (5) intrapersonal understanding of social norms.
See Table 1 and 2 for further details.
To allow participants to give their optimal interpretation of each interaction and
capture the quality of their response, each participant was prompted once with the
question, “Can you tell me more about what you mean by that?” or “Can you explain
that in a little bit more detail?” Participants were prompted if they gave a limited
response or their response lacked important information from the interaction. The
general comprehension question was not scored as misinterpretations of the social
interaction would become evident when participants answered the subsequent social
cognition test questions. Participants were asked the social cognition test questions
even if they misinterpreted the social interaction. Each question was awarded a max-
imum of 3 points, with a maximum score of 30 points for each social cognitive ability.
The maximum total score was 120 points and the ESCoT took approximately
20–25minutes to complete.
Participants
Nineteen adults (12 males, 7 females) aged 19–66 years (M¼ 38.47, SD ¼ 15.63) with a
diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome (AS) or High-Functioning Autism (HFA) according to
established DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000) were
recruited from charities, support groups and from a research database (cf. according
to DSM-V, they would all be diagnosed as Autism Spectrum Disorder). Participants
confirmed their clinical diagnosis of ASD via official diagnosis letters which they
received from their clinician. A comparison group of thirty-eight NC adults (23 males,
15 females) aged 19–67 years (M¼ 37.50, SD¼ 17.75) were recruited using online
advertisement and through a research volunteer panel.
We used previously acquired data from 236 NC adults between the ages of 18
and 85 (some were included in this study as controls) to establish normative data
and derive ESCoT cut-off scores for the subtests and total scores based on the
Table 1. Description of the questions from the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT).
ESCoT question Social cognitive ability Purpose
Can you tell me what’s
happening in this story,
starting with the first picture
and finishing with the
last picture?
Allow participants to describe what
occurred in the social interaction.
What is X thinking? Cognitive ToM Assess participants’ ability to make
inferences about another person’s
cognitive state.
How does X feel at the end of
the animation?
Affective ToM Assess the ability to make inferences
about the affective states of the
character in the interaction.
Did X behave as other people
should behave?
Interpersonal understanding of
social norms
Assess participants’ understanding of
the subtle societal rules that
govern social behavior and whether
the character in the interaction was
adhering to these rules.
Would you have acted the same
as X in the animation?
Intrapersonal understanding of
social norms
Assess how the participants
themselves would have acted in
the interaction.
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lowest 5th percentile. These individuals were recruited through online advertisement
and through a research volunteer panel. This included 147 younger adults (67
males, M age¼ 23.39, SD¼ 4.11, range¼ 18–35, M education¼ 16.90, SD ¼ 2.20), 30
middle-aged adults (15 males, M¼ 50.60, SD¼ 5.77, range¼ 45–60, M educa-
tion¼ 15.53, SD ¼ 2.86) and 59 older adults (23 males, M¼ 72.44, SD¼ 6.05,
range¼ 65–85, M education¼ 14.58, SD ¼ 2.88). None of the NC adults had any
self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders based on the exclusion
criteria from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) (Wechsler, 1997).
Informed consent was obtained from all individuals and the study was approved by
the local ethics committee.
The participants’ demographic information, ASD screening questionnaires and IQ
scores are reported in Table 3.
Table 2. Example scoring of the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) taken from Scenario 1.
ESCoT subcomponent Points Scoring instructions
Cognitive ToM (max
¼ 3)
3 A social answer that recognises that the elderly lady required assistance and
provides a contextual reason of why she needed assistance. Mention of
affective state limits mark to 2 points.
2 A social answer that recognises that the elderly lady required assistance. No
more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is not
given (prompt).
1 A non-social answer that recognises that the elderly lady required assistance. No
more than 1 point can be gained if there is no mention of the other person
from the interaction in the response, even with a contextual reason (prompt).
0 Don’t know/irrelevant answer.
Affective ToM (max
¼ 3)
3 An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, with a
contextual reason (prompt).
2 An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, with a
contextual reason (prompt).
1 An answer that demonstrates a higher or lower order emotional
understanding with no contextual reason (prompt).
0 Don’t know/irrelevant answer.
Interpersonal
understanding of
social norms (max
¼ 3)
3 A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social norm
highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable manner, and
provides a contextual explanation of why the lady needed help.
2 A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social norm
highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable manner. No more
than 2 points can be gained if a contextual explanation is not
given (prompt).
1 A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social norm
highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable manner (prompt)
OR states that the man acted appropriately.
0 Don’t know/irrelevant answer.
Intrapersonal
understanding of
social norms (max
¼ 3)
0 Participants receive 0 points for answering the YES/NO question (‘Would you
have acted the same as the person in the animation?’) incorrectly.
1 Participants receive 1 point for answering the YES/NO question (‘Would you have
acted the same as the person in the animation?’) correctly.
1 or 2 An additional 1 point is awarded for answers which highlight a personal
attribute of the participant (e.g. I’m a nice person) while answers which
highlight the context of the animation receive an additional 2 points.
The responses for cognitive ToM, affective ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms were scored simi-
larly. Scores were based on the quality of the answer with maximum points awarded for successfully extracting and
integrating the relevant information and articulating it in a contextually specific manner. Importantly, response
length was not related to quality; participants could score maximum points with a minimal response. For the intra-
personal understanding of social norms, responses that considered the social nuances of the interaction were scored
more highly than responses that highlighted personal attributes of the participant.
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Measures
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II) (Wechsler, 2011):
The WASI-II was administered as a measure of verbal comprehension and perceptual
reasoning. Participants completed four subtests: Vocabulary; Similarities; Block Design;
and Matrix Reasoning. The Vocabulary and Similarities subsets provided a Verbal
Comprehension Index (VCI) and Block Design and Matrix Reasoning provided
a Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI) (McCrimmon & Smith, 2013; Wechsler, 2011).
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001): This self-report
questionnaire assesses whether individuals with a normal IQ possess traits related to
the autism spectrum (maximum score¼ 50).
The Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004): The EQ measures
the ability to identify and understand the thoughts and feelings of others and to
respond to these with appropriate emotions (maximum score¼ 80).
The Systemizing Quotient (SQ) (Wheelwright et al., 2006): The SQ assesses the drive
to analyze or construct systems such as mechanical systems (maximum score¼ 150).
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001): Participants
were presented with photographs of the eye region of human faces and selected a
response from four adjectives which best described what the individual was thinking
or feeling. Prior to performing the test, participants were provided with a glossary to
clarify what each adjective meant, in case they were unsure or unfamiliar with the
word. Participants were given unlimited time to respond (maximum score¼ 36).
Higher scores indicated better performance.
The Reading the Mind in Films (RMF) (Golan et al., 2006): Participants viewed short
scenes of varying durations involving social interactions from feature films and
selected a response from four adjectives that best described what the protagonist was
thinking or feeling at the end of the scene. Again, participants were provided
with a glossary of the adjectives for clarification and responded verbally. There was no
time limit for responses and participants could score a maximum of 22 with higher
scores indicating better performance.
The Social Norms Questionnaire (SNQ) (Rankin, 2008): The SNQ was developed to
screen patients for potential behavior changes and examines how well participants
Table 3. Demographics information of participants: Mean (SD).
Max
score ASD n¼ 19 ASD range NC n¼ 38 NC range Sig gp2 (d)
Age 38.47 (15.63) 19–66 37.50 (14.75) 19–67 ASD¼NC 0.001 (0.09)
Sex (M:F) 12:7 – 23:15 – – –
Years of
full-time
education
15.21 (2.53) 11–20 16.16 (2.54) 11–21 ASD¼NC 0.03 (0.36)
AQ 50 34.63 (7.43) 14–45 16.34 (5.07) 6–25 ASD<NC 0.69 (2.95)
EQ 80 14.21 (8.55) 4–34 29.92 (7.20) 7–42 ASD<NC 0.49 (1.97)
SQ 150 48.11 (19.88) 19–100 45.32 (12.71) 22–70 ASD¼NC 0.01 (0.22)
VCI 160 95.50 (15.62) 68–130 105.02 (9.97)a 76–120 ASD<NC 0.19 (0.96)
PRI 135 99.06 (21.13) 64–131 107.94 (13.07)a 81–134 ASD¼NC 0.10 (0.68)
ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; AQ, Autism Spectrum Quotient; EQ, Empathy Quotient; SQ, Systemizing Quotient;
VCI, Verbal Comprehension Index; PRI, Perceptual Reasoning Index.Analyses were conducted using parametric and non-parametric tests where appropriate. All p< .05.
aNC n¼ 37.
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understand the social standards that govern their behavior in UK mainstream culture.
Participants were given a list of behaviors (e.g. tell a stranger you don’t like their hair-
style?) and asked to indicate whether or not the behaviors were socially acceptable to
perform in the presence of a stranger or acquaintance, not a close friend or family
member (maximum score¼ 22). Higher scores indicated better performance. The SNQ
also calculates the types of errors made by participants. An over-adherence error
occurs when the statement is socially acceptable, but the participant disagrees with it.
A rule-break error is when responses violate a social norm.
Procedure
Participants completed the measures in a single session, taking approximately two
hours to complete. The ASD questionnaires were completed online. The order of the
tasks was the same for each participant and regular breaks were provided.
Statistical analysis
Inter-rater reliability was assessed using intraclass correlations (ICC) for a random 10%
of the sample using raters blind to the diagnosis of the groups. The analysed ESCoT
data were age-adjusted based on the regression analyses published in Baksh et al.
(2018; see supplementary materials). Parametric and non-parametric analyses were
conducted based on initial exploratory analyses (Shapiro-Wilk test, p> 0.05).
Correlational analyses were conducted on all participants using Spearman’s rho correl-
ational analyses to examine the relationship between the ESCoT and the established
social cognition tests. To examine overall differences on the ESCoT subtests (cognitive
ToM, affective ToM, inter- and intrapersonal understanding of social norms) and SNQ
subtests (over-adherence and rule break), a Friedman Test was used. If this yielded a sig-
nificant difference, follow-up analyses were conducted using independent samples and
paired-samples t-tests for cognitive and affective ToM while Mann-Whitney U and
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were performed for inter- and intrapersonal understanding
of social norms and the SNQ subtests. An independent sample t-test was performed to
examine mean group differences on the RME. Mann-Whitney U tests were performed on
ESCoT total scores, RMF and SNQ total scores. The alpha values were set at p< 0.05 and
the Holm correction to adjust for multiple comparisons was applied. Effect sizes using
both partial eta squared (gp2) and Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988, 1992) were calculated.
The relationship between performance on all social cognition tests and the ASD
screening questionnaires (AQ, EQ and SQ) were examined using an exploratory regres-
sion analysis. In the first stage, the background predictors (age, sex, years of education)
which significantly correlated with the outcome variables (ESCoT total scores and estab-
lished social cognition tests) at a pre-specified significance level of p< 0.20 were
entered into the analysis (Altman, 1991) using the enter method. We chose a signifi-
cance level of p< 0.20 over more traditional levels such as p< 0.05 since p< 0.05 can
fail in identifying variables known to be important to the outcome variable and simula-
tion studies have shown that a cut-off of p< 0.20 yields better outcomes (Bursac et al.,
2008; Lee, 2014). VCI scores were included in the first stage of the regression analysis if
8 R. A. BAKSH ET AL.
VCI scores correlated with the outcome variables (ESCoT total score, RME, RMF and SNQ
total scores) at p< 0.20. In the second stage, AQ, EQ and SQ scores were entered using
the stepwise method (entry criterion p< 0.05, removal criterion p> 0.10). Finally, we
conducted Area Under The Curve (AUC) and Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC)
curve analysis to examine the discriminative abilities of the ESCoT and established tests.
Results
Cut-off scores to detect abnormal performance on the ESCoT
Raw score age adjustments were applied (Baksh et al., 2018; see supplementary mate-
rials). ESCoT cut-off scores for the subtests and total scores were based on the lowest
5th percentile. Using the cut-offs, 6.77% of our 236 NC were impaired on the cognitive
ToM subtest, 4.66% on affective ToM, 6.77% on interpersonal understanding of social
norms and 6.77% on intrapersonal understanding of social norms. 5.50% of NC adults
were impaired on ESCoT total score. Table 4 shows the cut-offs for each subtest and
ESCoT total scores.
Inter-rater reliability
Excellent inter-rater reliability (Cicchetti, 1994) was observed for all subtests of the
ESCoT: cognitive ToM (ICC¼ 0.80), affective ToM (ICC¼ 0.97), interpersonal understand-
ing of social norms (ICC¼ 0.96), intrapersonal understanding of social norms
(ICC¼ 0.98) and the ESCoT total score (ICC¼ 0.97).
As Table 5 shows the cognitive ToM subtest of the ESCoT significantly correlated
with the RME, RMF and SNQ. The affective ToM subtest positively correlated with
Table 4. Cut-off scores for the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) subtests
and total score based on the 5th percentile.
Maximum score Cut-off score
Cognitive ToM 30 17 or less
Affective ToM 30 19 or less
Interpersonal understanding of social norms 30 18 or less
Intrapersonal understanding of social norms 30 22 or less
ESCoT total score 120 83 or less
Table 5. Correlations between the tests of social cognition.
ESCoT
total score
Cognitive
ToM
Affective
ToM
Interpersonal
norms
Intrapersonal
norms RME RMF
Cognitive ToM 0.64
Affective ToM 0.58 0.33
Interpersonal norms 0.86 0.39 0.28
Intrapersonal norms 0.47 0.002 0.08 0.55
RME 0.48 0.36 0.25 0.38 0.27
RMF 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.30 0.10 0.62
SNQ 0.34 0.33 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.33 0.39
p< 0.05p< 0.01p< 0.001.
ToM; Theory of Mind, ESCoT; Edinburgh Social Cognition Test, RME, Reading the Mind in the Eyes, RMF, Reading the
Mind in Films, SNQ, Social Norms Questionnaire. Analyses were conducted using non-parametric tests.
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the RMF. Interpersonal understanding of social norms significantly correlated with the
RME and RMF. Intrapersonal understanding of social norms significantly correlated
with the RME.
ESCoT total scores significantly positively correlated with the RME, RMF and the
SNQ. The RME test significantly correlated with the RMF and SNQ. Performance on the
RMF positively correlated with performance on the SNQ.
ESCoT subtest correlations
Cognitive ToM significantly correlated with affective ToM and interpersonal under-
standing of social norms. While affective ToM positively correlated with interpersonal
understanding of social norms, performance on interpersonal understanding of social
norms correlated with performance on the intrapersonal understanding of social
norms. Intrapersonal understanding of social norms did not significantly correlate with
performance on cognitive ToM or affective ToM. All subtests significantly correlated
with ESCoT total score.
Group comparisons between ASD adults and NC on ESCoT and established
social cognition tests
A non-parametric Friedman test showed a statistically significant difference between
the subtests of the ESCoT (v2 (3)¼ 74.91, p< 0.001) for NC and ASD. Post-hoc analysis
with Holm correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated performance was poorer
on the cognitive than the affective ToM (t(56)¼7.17, p< 0.001, gp2¼ 0.20, d¼ 1.04).
As shown in Table 6, ASD adults scored significantly lower than NC adults, on
cognitive ToM (t(23.26)¼4.40, p< 0.001, gp2¼ 0.45, d¼ 1.82) and affective ToM
(t(23.76)¼3.70, p< 0.01, gp2¼ 0.37, d¼ 1.52).
All participants performed poorer on inter- compared to intrapersonal understanding of
social norms (Z ¼ 6.31, p< 0.001, gp2¼ 0.70, d¼ 3.05). Furthermore a significant differ-
ence was found between groups, with the ASD group performing poorer than NC, on the
interpersonal understanding of social norms (U¼ 140.50, p< 0.001, gp2¼ 0.25, d¼ 1.15)
and intrapersonal understanding of social norms (U¼ 226.50 p< 0.05, gp2¼ 0.09, d¼ 0.64).
Table 7 shows the group comparisons on the established social cognition tests and
ESCoT total scores. Overall, performance on the ESCoT was significantly poorer for the
ASD group than the NC group. Moreover, scores were significantly lower for the ASD
group on the RME and RMF compared to NC. ASD adults performed poorer than NC
on the SNQ total scores. There were no statistically significant differences between
ASD adults and NC for the SNQ subtests (v2(1)¼ 0 .49, p> 0.05).
Table 6. Results by group for the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) subtests: Mean (SD).
Max score ASD n¼ 19 ASD range NC n¼ 38 NC range
Cognitive ToM 30 18.63 (3.68) 12–27 22.61 (1.97) 19–26
Affective ToM 30 22.16 (4.30) 14–28 26.08 (2.40) 21–30
Interpersonal norms 30 19.26 (3.94) 10–25 23.45 (2.81) 18–28
Intrapersonal norms 30 24.89 (3.02) 19–30 26.74 (2.09) 21–30
ToM; Theory of Mind. All scores were age corrected.
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Post-hoc power analysis
While we reported large effect sizes (smallest Cohen’s d¼ 0.64), we were nevertheless
interested in confirming that our analyses were not underpowered due to our sample
size. Post hoc power analyses found power for the group comparisons to be excellent
for all group comparisons (all power analyses between 0.94 and 1.00, alpha lev-
el¼ 0.05) with the exception of intrapersonal understanding of social norms (power-
¼ 0.59) and the SNQ (power¼ 0.71).
Relationship between social cognition tests, ASD screening questionnaires and IQ
The variables that correlated with ESCoT total scores at p< 0.20 were age
(rs (57)¼0.19, p< 0.20), years of full-time education (rs (57)¼ 0.32, p< 0.20) and VCI
scores (rs (55)¼ 0.39, p< 0.20). These were included in the regression analysis using the
enter method in the first stage. None of the predictor variables correlated significantly
with one another at p< 0.01 after years of full-time education was accounted for; there-
fore, the effect of suppressor variables was not examined. In the stepwise regression
analysis for ESCoT total score, years of full-time education (b¼ 0.84, p< 0.05) and AQ
scores (b¼0.62, p< 0.01) were retained in the model and accounted for a significant
proportion of variance in ESCoT total scores (R2¼ 0.61, F(4, 50)¼ 19.86, p< 0.001).
Only VCI significantly correlated with RME scores at p< 0.20 (rs (55)¼ 0.30,
p< 0.20). This was included in the regression analysis using the enter method in the
first stage. In the final model, VCI scores (b¼ 0.09, p< 0.05) and EQ scores (b¼ 0.14,
p< 0.01) accounted for a significant proportion of variance in RME performance
(R2¼ 0.19, F(2, 52)¼ 6.20, p< 0.01).
For the RMF, participants’ sex (1¼male, 2¼ female, rs (56)¼ 0.25, p< 0.20) and VCI
scores (rs (54)¼ 0.45, p< 0.01) were included in the first stage of the analysis. In the
final model, VCI scores (b¼ 0.10, p< 0.001) and AQ scores (b¼0.11, p< 0.01) were
retained and accounted for a significant proportion of variance in RMF scores
(R2¼ 0.42, F(3, 50)¼ 12.15, p< 0.001).
Participants’ VCI scores were included in the first stage of the regression analysis for
SNQ scores (rs (55)¼ 0.34, p< 0.20). In the final model, VCI scores (b¼ 0.06, p< 0.01), EQ
scores (b¼ 0.06, p< 0.01) and SQ scores (b¼ 0.03, p< 0.05) accounted for a significant
proportion of variance in SNQ scores (R2¼ 0.32, F(3, 51)¼ 7.87, p< 0.001).
Table 7. Results by group for the tests of social cognition: Mean (SD).
Max
score ASD n¼ 19 ASD range NC n¼ 38 NC range Statistic (df) p-value gp2 (d)
ESCoT total
scorea
120 84.95 (10.11) 64–96 98.87 (4.92) 90–107 U¼ 64.50 p< 0.001 0.44 (1.79)
RME 36 23.26 (3.84) 17–29 27.47 (4.03) 17–34 t(55)¼3.77 p< 0.001 0.21 (1.02)
RMF 22 10.26 (2.54) 6–15 14.03 (2.17)b 8–18 U¼ 94.00 p< 0.001 0.36 (1.50)
SNQ total
score
22 17.37 (2.22) 12–21 18.95 (1.84) 14–22 U¼ 208.50 p< 0.01 0.12 (0.74)
ESCoT¼ Edinburgh Social Cognition Test, RME¼ Reading the Mind in the Eyes, RMF¼ Reading the Mind in Films,
SNQ¼ Social Norms Questionnaire. Analyses were conducted using parametric and non-parametric tests where
appropriate.
aAge-corrected.
bNC n¼ 37.
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AUC and ROC analysis for the social cognition tests
The AUC values and 95% confidence intervals for the tests were: 0.91 (0.83–0.98) for the
ESCoT total score, 0.77 (0.65–0.89) for the RME, 0.87 (0.77–0.97) for the RMF and 0.71
(0.57–0.86) for the SNQ total score. These results demonstrate that of the social cogni-
tion tests, the ESCoT is the most effective at distinguishing between the two groups.
Figure 2 shows a plot of the diagnostic value of the ESCoT compared to established
tests of social cognition (RME, RMF and SNQ). Overall, the ESCoT showed the highest
accuracy of the four tests.
Number of ASD and NC adults impaired on the ESCoT
Based on our cut-off scores, 36.84% of ASD adults were impaired on the cognitive
ToM subtest compared to 0% of NC adults, and 26.31% were impaired on affective
ToM compared to 0% of NC. On interpersonal understanding of social norms, 36.84%
of the ASD group were impaired compared to 7.89% of the NC group. A total of
15.79% of adults with ASD were impaired on intrapersonal understanding of social
norms compared to 5.26% of the NC adults. Finally, 42.11% of ASD adults were
impaired on overall ESCoT scores compared to 0% of the NC adults.
Discussion
The ESCoT is a new test of social cognition that assesses cognitive ToM, affective ToM
and inter- and intrapersonal understanding of social norms within the same test. We
investigated the convergent validity of the ESCoT against traditional tests and
Figure 2. ROC curves for the ESCoT, RME, RMF and SNQ. The closer the curve comes to the refer-
ence line, the less accurate the test.
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compared performance of ASD adults to NC adults on these tests. Moreover, we exam-
ined the influence of intelligence and ASD diagnosis on the ESCoT and traditional
tests of social cognition. The ESCoT showed good convergent validity with traditional
social cognition tests. ASD adults performed poorer on all subtests of the ESCoT and
traditional tests compared with NC. Regression results showed that better overall per-
formance on the ESCoT was predicted by more years of education and lower AQ
scores. ESCoT total score was not predicted by VCI or PRI; this contrasts with perform-
ance on the traditional social cognition tests included in this study. Higher VCI scores
predicted better performance on the RME, higher VCI and EQ scores predicted better
performance on the RMF while higher VCI, EQ and SQ scores predicted better per-
formance on the SNQ. The ESCoT showed very good discriminative value, followed by
the RMF, the RME and the SNQ. Overall, the ESCoT showed the highest accuracy com-
pared to the RME and SNQ. A total of 42.11% of ASD adults were impaired on the
ESCoT total score compared to 0% NC.
Significant associations between the ESCoT and traditional social cognition tests
provide evidence of convergent validity for the ESCoT as a test of social cognition (see
supplementary materials for scatterplots and correlations divided by group). The cog-
nitive ToM subtest of the ESCoT positively correlated with the RME. There is currently
debate relating to what the RME assesses and some authors have argued that the
RME is a test of emotion recognition (Oakley et al., 2016). While it could be argued
that the RME is an affective ToM measure (Duval et al., 2011), our findings suggest
that it relates to cognitive components of ToM. Indeed, the RME asks participants to
infer what the person is thinking or feeling. Intrapersonal understanding of social
norms did not correlate with cognitive and affective ToM of the ESCoT but was posi-
tively correlated with the RME. Furthermore, the RME correlated with our measure of
empathy. It may be that the RME is related to several aspects of social cognition. The
positive correlations between ESCoT subtests (particularly cognitive and affective ToM)
suggests that performance on one ability is associated with performance on other
abilities, but still show differentiation in performance in that they are predicted by dif-
ferent but overlapping constructs. Performance on cognitive ToM was predicted by
age, but performance on affective ToM was predicted by age and sex (Baksh et al.,
2018). These findings show that while cognitive and affective ToM are distinct, they
do overlap (Kalbe et al., 2010; Sebastian et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010), and
both should be considered when assessing ToM.
Poorer performance of ASD adults compared to NC on cognitive ToM, affective
ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms supports previous findings
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Castelli et al., 2002; Golan et al., 2006;
Murray et al., 2017; Thiebaut et al., 2016; Zalla et al., 2009). Although the ESCoT
showed good sensitivity on all subtests, the finding that ASD adults showed impaired
intrapersonal understanding of social norm is somewhat in contrast to our prediction
and previous findings of intact performance (Baez et al., 2012; Gleichgerrcht et al.,
2013). Our findings show that ASD adults have difficulties with how they should
behave in social interactions. However, it is possible that the ASD group had difficul-
ties in processing the wider context of the interaction, due to difficulties in weak cen-
tral coherence (the inability to understand context) (Frith, 1989, 2003). In this study,
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individuals with ASD generally knew when a social norm had been violated and
responded appropriately to the yes/no aspect of the question. Yet, in general, partici-
pants with ASD gave egocentric responses (e.g., I’m a nice person) regarding why they
would/would not have behaved as the character in the animation, instead of referenc-
ing the wider context of the interaction (e.g., they needed help, helping others is the
right thing to do) to explain why they would have behaved in a particular way.
A major advantage of the ESCoT over existing tests is the magnitude of the reported
effects. Our effects sizes for the group differences on cognitive and affective ToM is
greater than those on the RME and RMF. Increased ecological validity may explain the
greater effect sizes found for the ESCoT compared to the RME, which lacks important
contextual information, and the RMF, which uses pre-existing stimuli that are overdram-
atized (Murray et al., 2017). With the ESCoT, we have shown that contextually driven tests
more clearly demonstrate group differences between ASD and NC. Performance on the
ESCoT may be more representative of the everyday difficulties faced by ASD adults com-
pared to NC. There are several other advantages of the ESCoT over existing tests in the
social cognition literature. Firstly, unlike tests such as the TASIT, the ESCoT is a short and
detailed test of social cognition with self-contained interactions. The ESCoT also provides
researchers and clinicians with two subtests of ToM and social norm understanding.
All participants performed better on affective ToM, compared to cognitive ToM,
which is similar to previous findings (Bottiroli et al., 2016; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007).
Participants were better on intrapersonal understanding of social norms compared to
interpersonal understanding. While other studies may find differential performance on
social cognitive abilities using different tests, these tests are not matched for difficulty.
Matching social cognition components for equivalent difficulty is challenging to achieve.
Future studies in individuals with ASD could examine ways of controlling for level of dif-
ficulty between subtests. Similar to previous findings (Murray et al., 2017), we found
that poorer performance on the ESCoT in the ASD group could not be explained by
general cognitive abilities while performance on the traditional tests was predicted by
VCI and PRI, similar to earlier work (Baker et al., 2014; Golan et al., 2006; Kaland et al.,
2002; McDonald et al., 2003). This is an advantage for the ESCoT as it can be used in
clinical populations who may show some impairment but still have intact verbal abilities.
Moreover, our NC group did not perform at ceiling on the test. The variability of per-
formance in the control group is maybe useful for detecting individual differences in
nonclinical populations. Further usefulness of the ESCoT is its superior diagnostic value,
compared to other social cognition tests, with an AUC value of 0.91.
A limitation of this study is the small sample size for the ASD group. However, the
large effects sizes (e.g., Cohens d¼ 1.79) and post hoc power analyses for the ESCoT
indicate that, even with a small sample size of ASD adults, we were able to detect
meaningful group differences. Further is the lack of formal diagnostic information
relating to symptom level data regarding our ASD participants. Moreover, there were
too few females to examine whether there were sex differences on the ESCoT. ASD is
a heterogeneous condition (Ghaziuddin & Mountain-Kimchi, 2004), and given our wide
age range and the changes in diagnostic criteria for ASD over the past 60 years, het-
erogeneity is more likely in our sample. It is also unknown whether our participants’
diagnoses were made close to the time of study inclusion. Recent research suggests
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that ASD symptoms improve in adulthood (Woodman et al., 2015), although other
studies suggest that core symptoms of ASD tend to persist and there are few changes
in adults over the lifetime (Beadle-Brown et al., 2006; Matson & Horovitz, 2010). Future
work should examine the relationship between ASD diagnosis, age of diagnosis, ASD
symptoms and ESCoT performance. In our findings, we found that a total of 42.11% of
ASD adults were impaired on the ESCoT total score (but still substantially higher than
the 0% of NC adults). Overall, ASD individuals performed poorer than NC, but individu-
ally, there was heterogeneity with the ASD group on the ESCoT. Further work is needed
to identify how scores on the ESCoT vary with ASD symptomology. While the groups
were not matched on verbal comprehension scores, in our NC group, verbal comprehen-
sion was not a predictor of ESCoT performance. Moreover, ASD participants were within
the normal IQ range (full-scale IQ > 70) therefore, future studies would benefit from
including lower functioning individuals to examine if the ESCoT may be useful in this
sample of individuals. Finally, the smaller group difference in intrapersonal understanding
of social norms compared to the other ESCoT subtests and the limited correlations with
other tests perhaps indicates that this subtest may not be performing as well as cogni-
tive ToM, affective ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms. However, few
studies have examined intrapersonal understanding of social norms in social cognition
research. Therefore, future research should validate this subtest against behaviour to
understand this social cognitive ability and how it relates to other domains.
Conclusion
We found that adults with ASD perform poorer than NC on cognitive ToM, affective
ToM and inter- and intrapersonal understanding of social norms. These impairments
may be responsible for the difficulties frequently observed in social interactions. The
convergent validity between the ESCoT and established tests of social cognition show
that the ESCoT is a sensitive test of social cognition in ASD adults. We showed that
the ESCoT can detect large effects with a restricted sample size and shows better diag-
nostic accuracy than established tests. Many of the current tests of social cognition
have limited use in clinical settings (Dodich et al., 2015) but we have demonstrated
that the ESCoT may be a useful test to assess patients and aid in the detection of
potential difficulties in ToM and social norm understanding.
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